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Deposit insurance represents an integral part of the financial safety net in most countries,
and the procedures in which it interacts with other safety nets can mend or break the
financial system.' What effect the creation of a unified, single regulator may have on the
efficiency of a deposit insurance system is a neglected point that requires careful consid-
eration. In recent years, many countries have opted to create a single regulator2 that com-
bines banking, securities, and insurance regulation into one unified body.' This "trend" in
setting up a single regulator has prompted many to study the relationship between the
single regulator and the central bank.4 Nevertheless, how this trend affects the deposit
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1. The importance of relationship among safety net participants is emphasised in the Financial Stability
Forum's Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance. See Financial Stability Forum, Guidancefor Developing
Effective Deposit Insurance, 6, 18 (Sept. 7, 2001),availbleathttp://www.fDICJ.gov/deposit/deposits/international
[hereinafter Guidance].
2. Some countries that have adopted the single regulatory system are Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Japan,
Ireland, South Korea, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See Jose de Luna Marinez &
Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Supervision, in FINANCIAL REGULATION: A GUIDE TO STRUC-
TULAL REFORM (Douglas Amer & Jj. Lin eds., 2003).
3. This article refers to such comprehensive financial regulatory bodies as single regulators, although they
may also be referred to as unified, integrated, or consolidated regulators.
4. See C.A.E. Goodhartd, Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision, FSI Occassional Paper No 1 (Nov.
2001), available at http://www.bis.org/fsi; Richard K. Abrams & Michael W Taylor, Assessing the Case for Unified
Financial Sector Supervision, in FINANCIAL REGULATION: A GUIDE TO STRUCTURAL REFORM (Douglas Arner & JJ.
Lin eds., 2003); David Llewellyn, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: "The Basic Issue,"
in ALIGNING FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY STRUCrTURES wiTH COUNTRY NEEDS 58 (J Carmichael, et al. eds., 2004);
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom,
28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 411 (2003).
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insurer has not been analyzed, even though this is the primary financial safety net that will
be influenced by the structure of financial regulation.
This article will attempt to analyze what implications the establishment of a single reg-
ulator may have on a deposit insurer. As is the case in the United Kingdom, there may be
circumstances where the deposit insurer is included in the single regulatory structure. This
article will examine the situation in Japan, where a single regulator has been created with
the deposit insurer maintaining independence from any other regulatory body. The Japa-
nese regulators closely follow the United States' regulatory changes, and their supervision
and regulation remain in the hands of multiple authorities. 5 While there are some redun-
dancies in this structure, it has proven effective for the time being, especially for the deposit
insurance system where separation ensures the independence of the scheme and plays an
important role in bank restructuring.
Deposit insurance has been in the spotlight in Japan for the past few years. The payoff
of deposit insurance has been stalled since 1995, and the payoff of current accounts will
continue until April 2005 due to various bank failures that have took place. The side effect
of this has been the nation-wide recognition of deposit insurance. While this is not the
ideal method of promoting awareness of deposit insurance, it is now possible to discuss the
benefits of deposit insurance with anyone in Japan.
This article first examines the criteria that would allow an assessment of the effectiveness
of deposit insurance. Theories of regulatory governance are considered in this respect. The
third section briefly discusses the theoretical backdrop of designing a deposit insurance
system. The fourth section analyzes the position of a deposit insurer in the context of a
single regulator. The focus of appraisal then turns to the historical and political background
of the Financial Services Agency in Japan (FSA) and the Japanese Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (JDICJ). The fifth section dissects the structures of the FSA and the DICJJ. Next,
FSA and DICJJ are assessed against the inDICJes developed in Section II. The article
purports to complement the other two articles in this volume with respect to deposit in-
surance systems.
1I. InDICJes of Regulatory Efficiency of Deposit Insurance
and of Financial Regulation
To evaluate regulatory efficiency and efficacy of the FSA and the DICJJ, it is necessary
to establish the relevant evaluative criteria and standards. Regulatory governance 6 is an area
that has been increasingly analyzed because of its impact on the financial sector. "A financial
system is only as strong as its governing practices, the financial soundness of its institutions,
and the efficiency of its market infrastructure."7 Efficient and effective regulatory gover-
nance stands as a key aspect of establishing and maintaining a safe financial system.
5. For example, banks are also supervised by the central bank, the Bank of Japan, while securities firms are
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, which is an affiliate of FSA.
6. Public sector governance is be defined as "the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is
exercised in a particular country. This includes: (1) the process by which governments are selected, held ac-
countable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and for-
mulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Daniel Kaufnann et al., Governance
Matters: from Measurement to Action, 37 FIN. & DEV. 10 (June 2000).
7. Udaibar S. Das & Marc Quintyn, Crisis Prevention and Management: The Role of Regulatory Governance,
IMF WORKING PAPER 02/163 (Sept. 2002), available at htp://www.grc-exchange.org/info-data.
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More specifically, regulatory governance can be defined as:'
" the capacity to manage resources efficiently and to formulate, implement, and enforce
sound policies and regulations-to be seen as the duty to meet the delegated objectives;
" the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions- [including] protection from industry capture and political interference,
complemented by an important element of principal-agency theory of regulation; and9
" the respect of the agency for the broader goals and policies of the (elected) legislature.
This definition is relevant to financial regulation in terms of fulfilling objectives, main-
taining independence from both the legislature and industry, and in managing resources
efficiently.
The financial sector has primarily been assessed through the framework of the joint
International Monetary Fund (JMF) and the World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram, (FSAP).'5 The FSAP assesses most of the main international standards established in
the financial sector, including: the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
the International Organization of Securities Commissions' (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles
of Securities Regulation, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors' (JAIS) In-
surance Core Principles, and more recently, the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) Rec-
ommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism." These stan-
dards do include, to a certain extent, an evaluation of the authorities responsible for financial
regulation.
A. CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL REGULATOR
To analyze the effectiveness of a financial regulator, the following criteria are used as
reference points:'2
(I) Clear. objectives: assisting senior management in making decisions on the efficient allo-
cation of resources and in determining appropriate policy response to a given situation.
8. Id. at p. 7.
9. The principal-agency theory assumes that information is asymmetrically distributed, with agents typically
having more information than their principals. "[Algents ... have an incentive ... to maximize their own
personal welfare rather than that of the principals by whom they are employed." In the regulatory context,
"the principals ... are the supporters of the political party in power, while the external stakeholders are the
supporters of the opposition parties. The principals elect the government of the day as their board to represent
their interests, and the government appoints a bureaucracy as its agent to manage day-to-day operations of the
public sector." The complexity in the public sector "relates to the difficulty in measuring and therefore moni-
toring" its performance. Jeffrey Carmichael, Public Sector Governance and the Finance Sector, in FINANCIAL SECTOR
GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002).
10. IMF & WORLD BANE, Analytical Tools of the FSAP (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.worldbank-org/
finance.
11. Other standards assessed are: the IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies; the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems; the OECD Corporate
Governance Principles; the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency; and Creditors Rights, CPSS-
IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement System, and International Accounting and Auditing Stan-
dards. Id. at 22.
12. Using the definition for general regulatory governance mentioned above and Abrams. Abrams, supra
note 4, at 41.
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(2) Independence, accountability, integrity, and adequate resources: independent agencies allow-
ing policies to be formulated based on long-term strategies. Independence is achieved
through rules governing removal of senior management, budgetary autonomy, and the
ability to allocate resources according to own internal policies. Accountability is essen-
tial for the agency to justify its actions against the background of the statutory or other
legal mandate conferred on it. Integrity is reflected in mechanisms that ensure that the
agency staff pursues proper institutional goals, without compromising them due to their
own behaviour or self-interest.
(3) Transparency: an appropriate structure and strategy that provides for public dissemina-
tion of the objectives, frameworks, and decisions (including their rationale), as well as
supporting data and other information used or produced by the regulatory agency.
(4) Effective enforcement powers: at a minimum, this includes the ability to require infor-
mation from regulated firms, to assess the competence and probity of senior manage-
ment and the owners of institutions, and to take appropriate progressive sanctions
against failure to comply with regulatory rules.
(5) Comprehensiveness of regulation: there should be no regulatory omissions or gaps in terms
of the types of activities or institutions that the agency regulates.
(6) Cost-effective regulation: regulation necessarily imposes a series of direct and indirect
costs on the financial system, which must be weighed against the benefits that may arise
from regulatory integration.
B. CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT INSURER
As mentioned above, the joint IMF-World Bank FSAP has been an important exercise
in promoting sound governance of financial regulatory agencies."5 Yet, the FSAP does not
include the evaluation of deposit insurance or other compensation schemes. It is therefore
necessary to establish separate assessment criteria for the regulatory efficiency of deposit
insurers. In doing so, the best reference point is the Financial Stability Forum's Guidance
for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Guidance).14
The components identified in Guidance will be used to examine the changes in regulatory
efficiency that result from the incorporation of the scheme into an integrated regulatory
system within the unified financial regulator structure. The main elements involved include
the following:
* Changes in moral hazard with regard to the scheme;
* Co-ordination with the overall objectives and framework of financial sector regulation
and other safety nets;
* Effective mandate and enforcement powers;
* Independence and adequacy of resources;
" Procedural adequacy;
" Adequacy of compensation; and
" Speed of claims and recoveries.
13. See Das, supra note 7; Stefan Ingves, Strengthening Governance Arrangements for Financial Sector
Oversight Agencies: Evidence from the FSAPs, Address at the APEC Policy Dialogue on Deposit Insurance
(Feb. 16-18, 2004), available at http://www.iDICJ.ca.
14. Guidance, supra note 1.
VOL. 39, NO. 1
ANALYZING JAPAN 67
Il. Theoretical Issues of Designing a Deposit Insurer
The self-fulfilling nature of banks is a fundamental reason why deposits are given special
protection. Banks operate based on the trust and confidence of customers, and information
to the contrary can be detrimental to a bank's business. Because of the nature of banking,
banks' assets are illiquid." Loans cannot be recalled easily, as they are subject to contracts
and difficult to resell based on their uncertain value. On the other hand, liabilities of banks
are liquid and demandable. If most depositors demanded the immediate withdrawal of their
deposits, -banks will not have sufficient cash in their vaults to meet the demand. This will
result in bank runs, which can occur with the mere rumour of insolvency16 This is the self-
fulfilling nature of the bank business, which provides the basis for affording banks special
protection by regulators. 17
To prevent bank fragility, a financial safety net is formed with various financial sector
authorities. Such a safety net usually consists of prudential regulation and supervision, a
lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and possibly financial assistance schemes for solvent
banks. The financial safety net would interact in a mesh of functions, to support the financial
system according to the public policy objective of the relevant country. Its power and au-
thority, or supervisory arrangements, will depend on the objective as well.
The financial safety net includes elements such as preventive measures (regulation and
supervision, supervisory ratings, and sanctions according to the ratings), management of
problems (lender of last resort, deposit insurance, regulatory sanctions, business reviews,
and financial assistance), and resolution of problem banks (bank insolvency procedures,
merger and acquisition procedures, bridge banks, and nationalization). Deposit insurance
is a critical element within this structure to ensure that banks' overall function is compre-
hensive and complete. Because each component complements another, the effectiveness of
the financial safety net increases when all aspects are covered.
A. RATIONALE FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The rationale supporting deposit insurance depends on the public policy objective of
each particular government. The primary objective will be to maintain financial stability
and to protect less sophisticated depositors. This is why deposit insurance systems have
been adopted in many countries following financial crisis or disruption in their financial
systems."s
Some countries have implicit coverage of deposits, which, though not statutorily defined,
result from a government policy to protect deposits. Implicit coverage may work when the
15. For a detailed discussion on asset-liability mismatch, see,Jonathan R. Macey& GeoffreyP. Miller, Deposit
Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities,
12 YLE J. ON REG. 1 (1995).
16. See Douglas W Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL.
EcoN. 401 (June 1983).
17. There are also factors that make banks more fragile than other corporate entities such as banks with a
higher risk profile will capitalize on the reputation and trust of conservatively operating banks as a free rider.
Further, the indistinguishability of banks will result in a failure of one bank to lead to withdrawal of deposits
from other banks. As depositors seek to liquidise their deposits, a general run on bank reserves may be
precipitated.
18. Asli Demirgiii;-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where does it Work?, NBER
WORKING PAPERS 2-3 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8493.
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financial system is relatively undisturbed by systemic problems, allowing the government
to bail out financial institutions experiencing some problems. In this case, the rationale for
deposit insurance may be to protect the financial industry rather than the small depositors.
The opaqueness of the financial condition of financial institutions that are protected creates
an inequitable regulatory framework.
The rationale for establishing explicit deposit insurance allows public authorities to close
banks more easily. The exposition of deposit insurance makes it politically acceptable to
liquidate insolvent institutions, given that less sophisticated depositors will be protected.
The actions of authorities will be justified by the system, which may have been previously
controversial.
B. DESIGN CONSIDERATION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
One of the drawbacks of an ill-designed deposit insurance system is moral hazard. Moral
hazard refers to the incentive for excessive risk taken by banks or those receiving the benefits
of protection. Moral hazard occurs when banks assume that all their deposits will be pro-






management to act against
excessive risk taking
to be designed to mitigate moral hazard affected by banking
Measures
" Standards, processes, and systems for ensuring appropriate
direction and oversight by directors and senior managers;
• Adequate internal controls and audits, management of risks;
• Evaluation of bank performance;
" The alignment of remuneration with appropriate business
objectives; and
" Management of capital and liquidity position.
Market discipline exercised • Shareholders and depositors must have knowledge sufficient
by shareholders as well as to assess the risk;
by large creditors and * Information disclosure should be readily available and
depositors who are exposed generally understood by the public;
to the risk of loss from • Sound accounting and disclosure regimes;
bank failure • Ongoing attention to the bank's soundness by rating
agencies, market analysis, financial commentators, and other
professionals.
Prudential regulation and * Sound and effective regulations covering the establishment
supervisory discipline of new banks;
• Implementation of minimum capital requirements;
* Qualification of directors and managers;
• Sound business activities;
o Fit and proper tests for controlling shareholders;
* Standards for risk management;
• Strong internal controls;
* External audits;
* Enforcing supervisory discipline through the monitoring of
the safety and soundness of banks, and of compliance issues,
in order to ensure that corrective actions are taken promptly
when problems surface.
19. Guidance, supra note 1, at 9-11.





methods to mitigate moral
hazard effective
* Placing limits on amounts insured;
" Excluding certain categories of depositors from coverage;
* Using certain forms of coinsurance;
" Implementing differential or risk-adjusted premium
assessment system;
" Minimizing the risk of loss through early closure of troubled
banks;
" Demonstrating a willingness to take legal action against
directors and others for improper actions
" Differential, or risk-adjusted differential, premium
assessment systems may be difficult to design and implement
in newly set up systems and emerging or transitional
countries;
" Early intervention, prompt corrective action, and when
warranted, bank closure, require that supervisors and deposit
insurers have the necessary legal authority, in-depth
information on bank risk, financial resources and incentives
to take effective action;
" Personal liability provisions and availability of sanctions can
reinforce incentives of bank owners, directors and managers
to control risk, but they depend on the existence of an
effective legal system that provides the necessary basis for
action against inappropriate behaviour;
" Individual country factor may determine effectiveness of
particular measures for mitigating moral hazard, the
commitment and ability to implement them, and the
advancement of reform agenda to eliminate gaps that may
limit their effectiveness.
As mentioned above, the objective of deposit insurance is to protect smaller depositors
and to bolster the confidence of the financial system. The way in which deposit insurance
is structured, intentionally or unintentionally, will influence the behaviour of depositors.
While the design will also affect the manner in which related parties act when the financial
system is stable, the question remains whether the structure is able to protect and sustain
depositors and the financial system in unstable situations.
Deposit insurance can be either implicit or explicit.20 In addition, some jurisDICJtions
do not have any insurance system at all. In most cases, no deposit insurance system suggests
an implicit government guarantee, at least for depositors of the largest financial institutions.
Deposit insurance provides a guarantee on certain deposits that is non-contingent. Thus,
explicit deposit insurance ensures legal certainty regarding the coverage of insured depos-
itors. On the other hand, explicit deposit insurance should not protect other depositors,
creditors, shareholders, or managers. Explicit deposit insurance cannot protect banks be-
cause it is only activated after a bank is closed.
Implicit deposit insurance is a "blanket guarantee" for all sorts of depositors (insured and
uninsured), other creditors, shareholders, and even managers. Implicit deposit insurance
often assumes that the bank remains in business (either because it is "too big to fail" or
because it is politically difficult to close a bank). This induces moral hazard incentives and
20. The creation of a deposit guarantee scheme by law, with rules regarding the extent of the insurance or
protection, the rules of the scheme and the type of deposits/depositors protected.
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competition concerns. Implicit deposit insurance may potentially shift the burden onto
taxpayers.
Implicit coverage creates uncertainty about the financial safety net and may cause more
moral hazard, on the assumption that the government would rescue depositors, or greater
disruption because of the uncertainty of how the government would react. Implicit deposit
insurance also implies a subsidy to the financial industry, as the industry would benefit from
insurance without having to pay the insurance premium.
In September 2001, the Financial Stability Forum endorsed the report of its Working
Group on Deposit Insurance as international guidance for national jurisDICJtions that
contemplate the adoption of an explicit, limited-coverage deposit insurance system.2' The
report is built on three general findings:
(1) Explicit and limited deposit insurance is preferable to implicit coverage if it clarifies
obligations to depositors and creditors and limits the scope for discretionary decisions;
(2) Deposit insurance systems must be properly designed, well implemented, and un-
derstood [by the public] to be credible and to avoid moral hazard; and
(3) To be effective, the deposit insurance function needs to be part of a well-designed
financial safety net, supported by strong prudential regulation and supervision, ef-
fective laws that are enforced, and sound accounting and disclosure regimes. 21
IV. The Status of the Deposit Insurer in the context of a
Single Regulator
The analysis in this section focuses on what considerations may be needed in the estab-
lishment of a single regulator for a deposit insurer. It will not attempt to discuss the pros
and cons of a single regulator per se, but will contemplate how deposit insurance is affected
by these arguments. It will also examine whether or not the deposit insurer should be
integrated into the single regulator.
The United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority, which is one of the largest single
regulators in the world, argues that an integrated compensation scheme would gain econ-
omies of scale and scope by offering a single point of contact for both regulated firms and
consumers.2 Because the number of compensation schemes preceding the Financial Ser-
vices Compensation Scheme (FSCS) were numerous and varied,24 the confusion of a lay-
person claiming insurance were considerable. The consolidation of the expertise into the
FSCS may also reduce the cost.
The justification provided by the Chancellor of Exchequer of the United Kingdom, when
announcing the establishment of a unified financial regulator, was the blurring of frontiers
among the various financial sectors.2 Now, there is yet to be a financial system that can
fully justify a single regulator, based on its unified financial markets. While London, with
21. Guidance, supra note 1, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator, 20 FSA OccAsioNAL PAPER
No. 2 (May 1999), available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy.
24. For deposit taking, banks: Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS); building societies: Building Societies In-
vestor Protection Scheme; insurance business: Policyholders Protection Scheme; friendly societies: Friendly
Societies Protection Scheme; and investment business: Investor Compensation Scheme
25. Briault, supra note 23, at 6.
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its merchant banks, is a forerunner, the majority of the institutions are small and medium
sized firms.26 There may be some confusion among investors, who have purchased deposit-
like products,27 with regard to the insurance given to the product. However, the strict
regulation when using "bank" in the business name should clarify any confusion. Further,
those who opt to buy investment products other than deposits are more likely to have better
financial knowledge compared to an ordinary depositor.
As discussed above, the coordination of the deposit insurer with the overall safety net is
crucial in assuring the organic operation of various safety net participants. In this respect,
smoothing the procedures and avoiding any undue duplication of functions is imperative
for financial regulation to be effective. The unification of financial regulators would stream-
line the coordination under one institution. Nevertheless, establishment of a lead regulator,
who has a clear mandate to coordinate, would also achieve this goal.1
8
Deposit insurers usually have a discreet function within the safety net. The possible areas
of coordination may be in declaring closure of banks and supervision of institutions. Because
deposit insurers, by nature, do not engage is an obvious turf war with other regulators and,
rather, function according to decisions made, they are able to operate in or out of a single
regulator.
A single regulator is able to accumulate expertise, preventing unnecessary reliance on
external assistance for specialized operations. A larger institution would be able to provide
the staff with a variety of career paths, which would attract qualified personnel.2 9 This would
benefit smaller economies even more, where experts are both scarce and in high demand.
This argument supports the integration of the deposit insurer into the single regulatory
structure.
The moral hazard that a single regulator may create is based on the premise that the
public will assume financial service institutions will receive equal protection as deposit in-
stitutions. The provision for appropriate information would rectify this problem, but main-
taining the independence of the deposit insurer would prevent financial firms from making
unqualified assumptions.
Another subtle issue is the possibility of losing culture and institutional memory that
agencies have nurtured over time by the integration into a single regulator. This may be
significant if the culture has been positive and a driving force of the institution.
V. Historical and Policy Background of FSA and JD1CJ30
In 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed the financial Big Bang, emulating the
U.K.'s financial liberalization of the 1980s. The three key words, free, fair, and global,
would in substance equate to a departure from relationship banking and a move to a com-
26. However, the market concentration of some of the larger merchant banks is high. Don Cruikshank,
Competition in UK Banking: A Report to the Chancellor of the Ercbequer (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.
hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial-services/banking/bankreview/fin-barik-reviewfinal.cfm.
27. For example, mutual funds with a cash card function.
28. Some also argue that establishing a single regulator would only bring about cosmetic changes. Marinez
& Rose, supra note 2, at 15.
29. Abrams & Taylor, supra note 4, at 48.
30. See, inter alia, THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 58-61 (Yoshi Suzuki ed., 1989); MAMIKO YoKoI-ARAI,
FINANCIAL STABILITY IsSUEs: THE CASE OF EAST ASIA (2002).
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petitive market culture. One of the main effects of the legislation was the abolishment of
the "Glass-Steagall" like demarcation of the financial industry. However, the legislation
brought forward the unification of the financial institution's supervision of the newly es-
tablished Financial Services Agency (FSA, previously Financial Supervisory Agency) and
amendments to the Deposit Insurance Law in order to accommodate the new bank-failure
regime.
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) previously held the authorization, supervisory, and trea-
sury role, which caused conflicts of interest in carrying out an effective financial regulatory
role. Further, supervision of the MOF was unprofessional, depending on old techniques
rather than on qualitative and quantitative data.
After the numerous scandals at the MOF and the Bank of Japan (BOJ),' the failure of
Yamaichi Securities, one of the four major securities companies, and the mounting problems
in the financial system, political pressure to strip power from the MOF heightened. Not
only was criticism towards MOF strong, but there was also recognition that the regulatory
and supervisory framework with MOF taking the lead was no longer effective in a dynamic
market age.32
Discussion of the establishment of a supervisory agency progressed because of the central
government's administrative reforms. However, the various regulatory failures of MOF
made the establishment of a new regulatory body inevitable.
The objective of establishing a financial supervisory agency entailed the separation of the
financial and fiscal roles of the MOE The FSA began as an external bureau of the Prime
Minister's Office, resulting in the complete separation of FSA from MOE With the estab-
lishment of the Financial Revitalization Commission (FRC), which is headed by a minister,
FSA was placed under the FRC.
In April 1998, the FSA was established through the enactment of the Establishing Law
of the Financial Supervisory Agency.33 This was abolished and replaced by the Act Estab-
lishing a Financial Reconstruction Commission,14 Which was again abolished as a result of
the reorganization of the central government and created the Financial Services Agency.
The objective of FSA is "to protect depositors, deposit insurance contractors, investors,"
and "to ensure the safe and sound management of financial institutions," and "to monitor
the fair trade of securities."" To accomplish these purposes, the FSA authorizes all financial
institutions, carries out their inspections, and monitors deposit insurance.3 6
31. Senior officials of the MOF were found to be corrupt because they granted financial products to banks,
which had provided monetary incentives, and this led to the arrest of several officials. Also, a BOJ official was
arrested for receiving favors from commercial banks. Claims have been made that some of the prosecutions
were harsh, considering that these methods had become common place. However, corrupt officials would not
have encouraged the financial system to develop in the Big-Bang's spirit, which was probably one reason the
"go-ahead" was given for these charges.
32. The unclear business tradition of Japan has inhibited competition in the financial market, and the back-
wardness of the financial system has been described by Drucker in a recent article as "... still largely pre-1950
and thoroughly antiquated." Peter Drucker, Innovate or Die, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 26.
33. Finance Supervising Agency Establishing Act, Law No. 101 of 1998 (Japan).
34. Financial Reconstruction Commission, Law No. 130 of 1998 (Japan).
35. Id. art. 17.
36. Id. arts. 4-3 through 4-33.
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In January 2001, the FRC was abolished and its functions were vested with the newly
renamed FSA1 7 This gives FSA an even greater mandate, including the revitalization of
financial institutions.
38
The relationship between MOF and FSA is governed in the clause, "relation with other
administrative organs." FSA can require the submission of necessary materials to accomplish
its objectives and call for the cooperation of other ministries to achieve efficient inspec-
tions.39 FSA has the power to demand MOF to comply with its requirements if its purpose
is justified. The actual operation of FSA has been independent from MOF with no observed
interference. The ministers in charge of FSA have increasingly become political heavy-
weights,40 with the current minister being a former academic who has become known for
his pursuits of financial reforms. 41 The cabinets have been careful to position a politician
that can be tough on financial institutions when necessary.
In the case of non-compliance or unfair trading, FSA possesses the power to carry out
an administrative order as explained above. 42 The FSA has distinguished its inspections
from the MOF's, which were notorious for secrecy and leniency. Sanctions were practically
unknown prior to 1998. However, this does not inDICJate the soundness of financial in-
stitutions in Japan, but the superficiality of the MOF inspections. Currently, inspections
are carried out with a two-week notice,43 and administrative orders, including the termi-
nation of operations, have been delivered to unsound institutions."
Deposit insurance in Japan was founded in 1971 to protect bank depositors and to main-
tain financial stability. In 1970, the Committee for Financial System Research, under the
37. Act Concerning the Foundation of Financial Services Agency, Law No. 130 of 1998 (Japan). The FRC
was abolished to signal the completion of financial reconstruction although this assumption is generally viewed
as wishful thinking. In with the Old..., EcoNoMisT, Jan. 6, 2001 at 1. The FRC was abolished with Law No.
102 of 1999.
38. Act Concerning the Foundation of Financial Services Agency, Law No. 130 of 1998, art. 3 (Japan).
39. Id. art 19.
40. The first FRC Minister, Yanagisawa, was respected by the financial community as being knowledgeable
in finance and economics, a fair player, and tough on non-complying institutions. The second FRC Minister,
Ochi, was a more conservative politician and was removed after promising sympathetic treatment to certain
banks if their examinations were too harsh. The third Minister, Sadakazu Tanigaki, was appointed in February
2 000, and he has declared that he does not intend to protect Japanese banks that are not viable. World News:
Asia-Pacific: Sony'Ambitions Test New Bank Reform Cbief FIN. TIMEs LIMITED, Mar. 7, 2000, at 12.
41. The current minister, Heizo Takenaka, was previously a well-known economics professor who the prime
minister hired to resolve problems in the financial sector. With the success he has achieved, Takenka has now
become an elected member of the Diet.
42. National Government Organization Act, Law No. 120 of 1948, arts. 12-3, 13 (Japan).
43. Although the MOF inspections were also supposed to be surprise-based, the financial institutions were
in fact notified before hand, allowing some prior action. Since this period lasted only a week or two, a complete
rewriting of books would not be possible, but hiding materials was a viable option.
44. After the establishment of FSA, the first administrative order revoked the license of Credit Suisse Fi-
nancial Products in July 1999 after months of investigations into its illegal window dressing of other financial
institutions' bad loans. In September 1999, FSA suspended the operations of Cresvale International, a HK-
based brokerage, for selling bonds of Princeton Economics, which did not have the US Treasury bills it claimed
the bonds were guaranteed by. This led to an FBI investigation of a fraud case involving billions of dollars.
Because the sanctions have been imposed mostly on foreign institutions, the FSA has been accused of being
unfair, although it is more likely that Japanese financial institutions do not have the competitive power to
conduct any risky business, although they had this power during the 1980s. However, recently, there has been
some criticism from foreign financial institutions that the FSA is being espically tough on foreign financial
institutions.
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aegis of the MOF, proposed the introduction of greater competition in the financial markets
with the keenly felt need to introduce depositor protection to support this measure.
The Deposit Insurance Law was passed in April 1971, and the Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration ofJapan (DICJJ) was established the same year as the special corporation managing
deposit insurance. Capital contributions of JPY450 million were made by the MOF, BOJ,
and private financial institutions, each contributing one-third of the capital.41
DICJJ was characterized by its compulsory membership for almost all private financial
institutions. The operation of DICJJ was kept within as narrow a gambit as possible, re-
stricted to the receipt of insurance premiums and payments of insurance claims. Private
financial institutions were represented on the board of DICJJ. The maximum payment to
any one depositor was limited to JPY3 million by government regulation at the time. In-
surance premiums were charged at 0.008 percent of protected deposits.4 In 1985, the Com-
mittee for Financial System Research proposed some changes to the deposit insurance
system; raising the maximum compensation to JPY10 million, insurance premiums to 0.012
percent 4" and the limit of borrowing from the BOJ from JPY50 billion to JPY500 billion.
Nevertheless, the value of DICJ was minimal to the financial system until 1991 because
the MOF followed a non-failure policy of financial institutions. Further, independence of
DICJ was seriously hampered by inadequacy of resources and limited enforcement power,
which was independently exercised. 4 There has not been a payout performed by the DICJ
to date.
In 1995, due to the mounting non-performing loans of financial institutions and the
continuous failures of banks, the Japanese government declared the protection of all de-
posits, freezing pay-offs for the time being. This was initially to be limited until March
2001, but has been repeatedly extended in December 1999 and October 2002, and was
terminated in April 2005.
In 1998, the Japanese financial system reforms dramatically affected DICJ. The structure
of deposit insurance was considered a moral hazard, and the need to create a bank failure
framework prompted the Japanese government to reconsider the operational framework of
DICJ. Part of this discussion evolved from the higher protection that postal savings were
offering to depositors and by the financial institution being crowded out of the deposit
market.
Three major changes were brought to the functions of DICJ:
* Purchase of non-performing loans from financial institutions;
* Injection of capital to financial institutions that have merged with a troubled financial
institution; and
• Administration of banks taken over.
45. Profile-Deposit Insurance Corporation ofapan, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEPOSIT INsURERs,available
at www.DICJ,go.jp (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
46. Changes in Insurance Premium Rates, DICJ OF JAPAN, available at http://www.DICJ.go.jp (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005).
47. Id.
48. See CRISIS AND CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, ch. 2 (Takeo Hoshi & Hugh Patrick eds.,
2000).
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"The amendments bolstered DICJ's financial condition with a JPY17 trillion ($155 bil-
lion) appropriation to be used for depositor protection. '49 "In addition to enhanced financial
and formal resources, DICJ's staff increased to almost three hundred." 0
The DICJ may purchase assets from any financial institution, including failed, nation-
alized, and sound instructions for the purpose of improving their capital adequacy until
March 2008.11 DICJ delegates the business of purchasing, managing, and collecting these
assets to a bank that it has exchanged a special contract with,52 resulting in the Resolution
and Collection Corporation (RCC).55 The DICJ's decision to purchase assets and the pur-
chase price are based on the criteria it sets out54 with the approval of Policy Board of DICJ.u1
The guideline for determining the purchase price of assets is based on the possibility of not
recovering the asset.5
6
In 1986, the Deposit Insurance Law was amended to permit the DICJ to provide financial
assistance in connection with the mergers of troubled banks.57 However, the amount of
assistance was limited to the hypothetical cost of paying off depositors. The DICJ maintains
authority to provide financial assistance to financial institutions that take over troubled
banks. The DICJ can provide financial assistance to financial institutions or financial hold-
ing companies that are undertaking a merger with a failed institution.5"
In the Financial Revitalization Law, the possible resolutions of bank failures are provided:
(a) by appointing financial conservators and placing the management of failed institutions
under their administration; 9 and (b) by nationalization, in which the DICJ acquires the
shares of the financial institution via a bridge bank or (c) by merger with a healthy bank.60
Under option (a), the failed institution will either be taken over by a healthy institution or
transferred to a bridge bank established by the DICJ. The bridge bank will continue the
business of the failed institution until the latter is taken over by another institution.
Further changes in the Deposit Insurance Law were introduced in 2002. 61 These allow
the protection of all checking, current, and savings accounts until March 2005, and a max-
imum protection ofJPY10 million for time deposits. 62 After April 2005, all current accounts,
which function as checking accounts, will receive full protection.63 Checking accounts are
49. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan's Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implications for Financial
Regulatory Design?, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 399, 421 (1999).
50. Id.
51. Law No. 130 of 1998, art. 53-1.
52. Id. art. 53-2.
53. DICJ is to exchange a special contract with a bank to carry out recovery and collection activities of loans
according to the Appendix of the Deposit Insurance Law. Deposit Insurance Law, Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 7-1
(Japan), available at http://www.DICJ.go.jp/English/e-laws/2002.9.10.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
54. Id. art. 55-1.
55. Id. art. 55-3.
56. Id. art. 56-1.
57. Id.
58. Id. art. 61-3.
59. Law Concerning Emergency Measures for the Revitalization of the Functions of the Financial System,
Law No. 132 of 1998, arts. 8-35 (Japan).
60. Id. arts. 36-52.
61. Under the 2002 Amendment, Chapter 3-2 was included. See Law No. 34 of 1971, arts. 69(1)-(4).
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defined as non-interest bearing, current deposits.64 Foreign currency deposits and negotia-
ble deposits are not protected.6s
The FSA is not as comprehensive as the Financial Services Authority in the United
Kingdom. First, the deposit insurance scheme is not subsumed under the FSA. There are
also other compensation schemes for investors and insurance products that are independent
from the FSA.6 Second, the Bank of Japan retains supervisory, although not regulatory,
power over the banks. Finally, the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission
(SESC) carries out inspections of securities companies. The SESC is poised to gain greater
enforcement power, similar to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States. The BOJ, DICJ, and SESC are institutions independent of the FSA, and are
void of its operational influence.67 The FSA sits ready to become the regulator of the Postal
Saving Bank when the latter becomes privatized. The Postal Saving Bank's failure to pay
deposit insurance has been sharply criticized by the private sector. It is likely that insurance
premiums will be charged after privatization.68
Recently, the FSA announced its five-year plan from fiscal year 2005, which includes the
creation of a financial conglomerate law. 69 This will be conducted through the establishment
of an "investment services law,"70 which will encompass various products instead of insti-
tutions. While the FSA regulates all financial intermediaries, the internal structure is func-
tional, hampering the development of financial conglomerates. It is preDICJted that a
relaxation of the rules would permit greater conglomeration and fiercer competition within
the industry." This would follow the path of the U.K. Financial Services Authority in
creating a rulebook applicable by transaction. The Financial Services Authority's problems
in developing the rule Handbook inDICJate some of the hurdles that may lie ahead for the
FSA.
VI. Structure and Objectives of FSA and DICJ
A. FSA
1. Objectives
The statutory objectives of the FSA are twofold: (a) to maintain the safety and soundness
of the financial system and to ensure its smooth operation; and (b) to protect consumers in
64. FSA & DICJ, THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM OF JAPAN (last visited Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://
www.DICJ.go.jp.
65. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION OF JAPAN, THE NEW DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM, available at http://
www.DICJ.go.jp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
66. The Securities and Exchange Law requires that securities companies join either the Japan Investor
Protection Fund or the Securities Investor Protection Fund, both of which are approved by the Finance
Minister. Invested assets are protected to a maximum ofJPYl0 million. Insurance products are protected by
the Insurance Product Protection Institute. Products are assumed by other member insurance undertakings or
by the Insurance Product Protection Institute.
67. The BOJ is not a government agency, but an independent central bank. The DICJJ is a separate agency,
although information sharing arrangements exist. The SESC, while nominally under the aegis of the FSA, is
a legally independent institution.
68. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, the Postal Saving Bank saved JPYI,600
billion (14.6 billion U.S. dollars) in deposit insurance premiums in the year 2002. David Pilling,.Japan's FSA
to Regulate Post Office Savings Unit, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004.
69. FINANCIAL. SERVICES AGENCY, PROGRAM FOR FURTHER FINANCE REFORM 8 (Dec. 2004), available at http://
www.fsa.go.jp/news.
70. Id.
71. David Ibison, Japan's FSA to Pave Way for Financial Conglomerates, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004.
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the financial sector (depositors and investors). 72 The FSA has elaborated upon these objec-
tives, enumerating six purposes:73
(1) Establishing a stable and vibrant financial system;
(2) Improving financial infrastructure so that it can remain at the forefront of the financial
system;
(3) Developing and administering rules, which take into account consumer protection;
(4) Conducting transparent and fair financial regulation, based upon clearly defined rules;
(5) Improving expertise and foresight in finance; and
(6) Strengthening cooperation with foreign supervisory authorities and making a positive
contribution to international standard setting.
2. Structure
Since January 2001, all matters related to financial regulation have integrated into the
FSA, while the MOF maintains limited powers in bank insolvency and crisis management
related to fiscal policy, treasury, foreign exchange, and currency.74 All other issues concern-
ing financial regulation are within the province of the FSA.75
There are three main departments in the FSA: (1) planning and coordination; (2) in-
spection; and (3) monitoring, which monitors financial institutions subject to regulation.
IN addition, there are the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public Accountant
and Auditor Commission under the FSA. The total staff inJune 2003 was 1,101 with a 5-
10 percent increase expected in the coming year.
3. Independence and Accountability Arrangements
The FSA is an external department of the Prime Minister's Office, which seeks to ensure
the FSA's independence from powerful ministries as discussed above.76 This arrangement
is the result of a reform in central government that took place in 1999. The FSA was
included in the reform measures and placed directly under the supervision of the Prime
Minister for two reasons. First, there was an inherent conflict of interest in the MOF's
previous responsibility for financial regulation. Second, the banking crisis that had been in
existence since the mid 1990s was hampered by the non-existence of a governmental de-
cision making body able to cope with financial difficulties. The Prime Minister has been
given direct responsibility over financial regulation.77
As such, the budget is determined within the fiscal budget. The FSA must publish annual
reports on the conduct of its functions. As a government agency, the FSA is also required
to make frequent appearances at the Diet when related matters are under discussion. Be-
cause the FSA is part of the government, independence is not an option. Nevertheless, as
an agency under the Prime Minister's Office, the FSA is better protected from turf wars
among government ministries.
72. Law No. 130 of 1998, art. 3.
73. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2003 4 (June 2004). These objectives were
stated by the head of the FSA-J during its establishment in July 2000.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Law No. 130 of 1998, art. 4.
76. Id. art. 2.
77. Establishing Law of the Prime Minister's Office, Law No. 89 of 1999, arts. 5-6 (Japan).
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4. Crisis Management: Co-ordination with Other Financial Safety Nets
In times of financial crisis, when there is a serious threat to the financial system, a financial
crisis management meeting is convened at the request of the Prime Minister. This meeting
determines how to manage the financial crisis, and includes the Prime Minister, the Sec-
retary of State, the Finance Minister, the FSA Minister, and the Governor of the BOJ.
According to the Deposit Insurance Law," the DICJ can take three measures against
financial distress:




Measure No. 1 Financial institution Financial assistance Decided by the FSA
(excluding those (acquisition of shares minister with the
subject to measure by DICJ to improve consent of the finance




Measure No. 2 Failed or insolvent Financial assistance FSA minister decides on
financial institution that exceeds the pay- the immediate
off cost administration of the
financial institution.
Measure No. 3 Failed and insolvent Acquisition by DICJ This measure can only be
financial institution (emergency taken when, without
management) this measure, the
financial institution
would pose a serious
threat to the stability of
the financial system.
A chairperson of the
bridge bank is





All deposits are protected.
5. Transparency and Enforcement
The Establishing Law of the FSA does not require greater disclosures by FSA. However,
the FSA's website and related press conferences provide ample information on its opera-
tions. Disclosures have noticeably improved since the FSA took over responsibility from
the MOF, which did not necessarily display a strong interest in promoting information
disclosure.
The Annual Report of the FSA reports the number of press conferences held and the
information made available on the agency's website. Japan adopted the Freedom of Infor-
78. Law No. 34 of 1971, arts. 102-126.
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mation Act in 1999, giving citizens a right to request the disclosure of public documents,
unless they touch upon privacy or security concerns.
79
Because of a 1999 cabinet decision, 0 all regulations should be formulated, amended, or
repealed after considering public comments. Further, new legislation requires the evaluation
of policy,"' and the FSA has conducted policy assessments of its own work.
B. THE DICJ
1. Objectives
The objectives of the DICJ are:82
" To provide a safety net for depositors, paying out insurance when a financial institution
is insolvent;
" To operate the deposit insurance system, providing financial assistance to and pur-
chasing non-performing loans of viable institutions;
" To act as the administrator of failed financial institutions; and
" To delegate the write-off of non-performing loans purchased by the DICJ's subsid-




The DICJ board consists of fourteen members, who comprise the Executive Committee.
In addition to the chairperson and four executive members, 3 there are eight non-executive
members.8 4 The non-executive members of the board are nominated by the chair and ap-
proved by the Finance Minister.8 The board's responsibilities include making decisions on
strategy, budget, insurance premiums, insurance payouts, financial assistance, and purchas-
ing the rights of assignment of deposits.8 6
b. Funding
From 1996 to 2001, insurance premiums have been divided into general premiums and
special premiums, but the special premiums were abolished in 2001. General premiums
fund the payment of deposit insurance and the cost of pay off incurred by the DICJ. In-
surance premiums are voted on by the DICJ board and approved by the Prime Minister
and Finance Minister. 7
79. Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs, Law No. 42 of 1999, arts. 3-5
(1999) (Japan) (Freedom of Information Act).
80. Public comment procedures for formulating, amending, or repealing a regulation, cabinet order of Mar.
23, 1999, available at http://www.soumu.go,jp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
81. Law Related to Policy Evaluation to be Carried out by Public Bodies, Law No. 86 of 2001 (Japan).
82. Law No. 34 of 1971, arts. 1, 34. For an overview of the Japanese Deposit Insurance System, see the
DICJ website, available at http://www.DICJ.or.jp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Overview].
83. Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 24. The chairman and executive members are appointed by the Prime Minister
with the approval of both the upper and lower houses of the Diet.
84. Id. art. 16.
85. Id. art. 17.
86. ANNuAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2003, supra note 73, at 26; Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 15.
87. Law No. 34 of 1971, arts. 51-51-2.
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Since 2001, insurance premiums have been divided for delegated accounts, which com-
prise current and checking accounts as well as other accounts.
Changes in insurance premiums in Japan:




1996- 0.048% 0.036% 0.084%
2001- Designated Other
accounts accounts
0.048% 0.048% 0.036% 0.084%
2002- 0.094% 0.080% None
Source: DICJ, Overview of the Japanese Deposit Insurance System www.DICJ.or.jp.
Since 2002, due to changes in protection being provided by deposit protection, desig-
nated accounts have been charged an insurance premium of 0.094 percent and other ac-
counts 0.080 percent. These premiums will be calculated against the balance of protected
deposits in the previous year.
VII. Regulatory Efficiency of FSA and DICJ
Although Japan formed a unified financial regulator, the DICJ represents an external
institution and possesses its own governance structure, subject to decisions by the FSA. The
deposit insurance scheme is a much more comprehensive operation including a key role in
financial crisis resolution, with the capacity to inspect financial institutions."8
A. CONSIDERATION OF THE FSA
1. Clear objectives:
Given the enormity of tasks that the FSA (and its predecessor the Financial Supervisory
Agency) have faced at the time of its establishment, it has carried out its objectives consid-
erably well, despite criticisms that have been lodged. The uptake on the consumer protec-
tion objective moved relatively slow, but in recent years, various initiatives have been
launched to educate and assist consumers in better understanding financial transactions. 89
The record non-performing loans have been gradually shrinking, changing the situation
88. FSA-minister will permit inspections by the DICJ on: (a) whether the appropriate payment of insurance
premiums is being made; (b) whether the compulsory database that financial institution must develop is being
instituted; and (c) when a financial institution fails, to examine the amount of deposit claims that may be subject
to settlement. Overview, supra note 82, at 43. Law No. 34 of 1971, arts. 37, 137.
89. This includes considerably improvement in the website and an informative website aimed for the edu-
cation of the general public and a special website for students. See generally, http://www.fsa.go.jp/syouhi/syouhi/
study.htm; http://www.fsa.go.jp/fukukyouzai/index.hm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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from dire to manageable. The FSA has responded to difficult situations such as the nation-
alization of various insolvent banks,90 and although there have been criticisms as to the
handling of some closure of banks, 9' the overall policy response has been positive.
2. Independence, accountability, integrity, and adequate resources:
The independence of the FSA has improved because of its establishment as an agency
separate from the MOE The unification of regulators has resulted in greater independence
in this respect, but the FSA remains a governmental agency directly under the responsibility
of the Prime Minister, which leaves open the possibility of political interference. On the
other hand, its position as an agency under the aegis of the Prime Minister may afford
certain protection from wider political interference.
The FSA has been able to recruit a wide number of experts and qualified staff. This has
helped improve its overall expertise profile. However, the limited nature of contracts does
not result in long-term employment of qualified staff, but rather in extracting their expertise
in a short period.92 Exceptions to this may need to be considered in order to attract highly
qualified professionals for a longer period.
3. Transparency:
Ample efforts seem to have been undertaken to improve the disclosure regime and trans-
parency of policies. This aspect, which was lacking in the predecessors of the FSA, should
be highly commended. However, while there are opportunities for public comment and
policy assessment activities, the complex legislative structure brings a certain degree of
rigidity to the process. Controversial comments may not be reflected or brushed aside to
carry on with the policy that has already been woven in the interest of all parties.
93
4. Effective enforcement powers:
The FSA is equipped with powerful regulatory powers, and it has engaged in more
determined regulatory actions since the unification. This includes the nationalization of
various financial institutions, which brings with it systemic implications as well as sanctions
90. The nationalization of the Long-Term Credit Bank (June 1998) and Nippon Credit Bank (Dec. 1998)
are some examples of the bridge bank method used to resolve the difficulties. Subsequently, these banks have
been successfully sold off.
91. When the fifth largest bank in Japan, Resona Bank, was nationalized in May 2003, the FSA-J was
criticized because it had been aware that Resona was insolvent when a capital injection was conducted. Also,
when one of the largest regional banks, Ashikaga Bank, was temporarily nationalized in November 2003, the
FSA-J was criticized that it was unable to detect the problems during an inspection conducted earlier.
92. State civil servants are usually recruited at the graduate level through a competitive examination. How-
ever, the Personnel Agency of the Civil Service has constructed special contracts to recruit qualified experts.
This is a short-term contract up to a maximum of five years, which is on a separate salary scale from the dismal
salaries of the normal civil servants. Nevertheless, the limited time and pay of the contracts has inhibited the
public sector from attracting talent from the private sector.
93. The Japanese legislative process has a lengthy informal process that usually is initiated when a ministry
has an interest in legislating on a certain topic. Then, a committee or expert group is convened to examine the
issue in question. Their findings are then proposed to the minister who initiates the formal legislative process
based on the proposals. However, what is not obvious is that the committee is not always independent of the
ministry's interest. Also, the proposals are usually a result of discussions within the group that is considered to
represent the various interest groups, and comments contrary of the final proposal may be difficult for the
ministries to accept. While there has been some legislation in recent years initiated by the proposal of the
legislature, this is unusual.
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against wrongdoers. In recent months, one of the more publicized sanctions involved the
closing of the private arms of Citigroup in Tokyo, which resulted in a public apology from
Citigroup's CEO.
5. Comprehensiveness of regulation:
The unification of the financial regulator has certainly closed any gaps in financial regu-
lation. The BOJ retained its supervisory role over banks in order to provide for limited
redundancy. Yet it is considered to create competition among regulators, and actions are
coordinated to restrict the regulatory burden of banks.
6. Cost effective regulation:
Cost effectiveness is not a primary or secondary consideration for Japanese regulatory
authorities, which may be explained by the historical power they exerted upon the industry.94
While the overt exercise of power on the industry has diminished, the regulatory agencies
do not cite cost as one of their considerations.
Currently, the regulatory burden has not been the subject of discussion in Japan, but it
may become so when the law on financial conglomerates is introduced. As is the case in
the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority, while creating a framework for the
regulation of conglomerates, seems to have increased the regulation burdenY5
B. CONSIDERATION OF THE DICJ
1. Changes in Moral Hazard:
Japan's deposit insurance has been protecting all deposits for the past decade and this
gives rise to serious concerns over moral hazards. Actual payment of deposit insurance has
never occurred in Japan. As such, depositors do not need to look seriously into the safety
and soundness of their deposit taking institution, safe in the knowledge that their deposits
would not be affected. Further, the financial institutions may take excessive risks knowing
that the DICJ may be able to provide financial assistance in the case of insolvency. The
Bank for International Settlement has also raised concerns as to the continuing imposition
of caps on deposit insurance.96
While the blanket guarantees of current accounts remain a possible source of moral
hazard, some practitioners have commented that due to the flexible use of Article 103 of
the Deposit Insurance Law, which gives discretion to the financial crisis management com-
mittee to remove authorization of financial institutions, financial institutions are behaving
more prudently. The discretion that the Prime Minister has given to the financial crisis
management committee creates greater uncertainty as to decisions on unsound institutions,
limiting the morally hazardous behaviour of financial institutions. It remains to be seen
however, how the behaviour of depositors will change after March 2005.
94. Japanese government ministries were, in the past, the manipulators of Japanese industry and politics. In
the financial industry, the Bank ofJapan and the Ministry of Finance used their influence to change the decisions
of financial institutions. YoKo-ASA, supra note 30, at 271.
95. The complexity of financial regulation has been daunting to many smaller and medium sized firms that
do not have the resources to make in-depth analysis of regulations to be issued.
96. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT, 74TH ANNUAL REPORT 2003 126 (June 28, 2004).
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2. Coordination with Overall Objectives and Framework of Financial Sector Regulation and
Other Safety Nets:
Critical decisions of the DICJ are subject to the approval by the Prime Minister, who
usually delegates this to the FSA minister, who delegates this to the CEO of the FSA. The
DICJ can borrow from the Bank of Japan when deemed necessary by the Prime Minister
and Finance Minister.97
The determination of a default is carried out through: (a) a termination of payment of
deposits by a financial institution; or (b) removal of authorization of the financial institution,
or declaration of administration/liquidation. 98 The financial institution must notify the re-
spective authorities, DICJ, FSA, BOJ, and MOF, when the above default occurs. 99
The co-ordination mechanism in times of crisis is also laid out. While the DICJ does
not have a decision-making role, it bears the primary responsibility for execution in times
of emergencies. Coordination with the FSA is as comprehensive as it is with the Bank of
Japan. There is no written protocol for this procedure, which is viewed as discretionary in
crises.
The DICJ in the framework of the overall safety net is more operational than decision-
making, and it establishes a cooperative working relationship with the other agencies in-
volved. This structure enables each institution to play a unique and individual role without
issues of independence arising.
3. Effective Mandate and Enforcement Power:
The deposit insurance scheme is a much more comprehensive operation including the
ability to inspect financial institutions. The FSA-minister will permit inspections by the
DICJ in relation to the following questions: (1) whether the appropriate payment of insur-
ance premiums is being made; (2) whether the compulsory database that the financial in-
stitution must develop is being instituted; and (3) when a financial institution fails, whether
to examine the amount of deposit claims that may be subject to settlement. 00 The DICJ
possesses the power to require financial institutions to submit information or reports to the
DICJ."°"
The DICJ is implementing strong measures to collect non-performing loans via RCC.
The Jusen Law, Deposit Insurance Law,102 and Financial Revitalization Law each grant
powers to the DICJ to conduct necessary operations to collect loans. 03 The DICJ can
investigate assets that are hidden, collect them, and prosecute wrongdoers for civil and
criminal violations. This operation has been rigorous and resulted in the collection ofJPY49
billion in hidden assets during the year 2002.104 The DICJ has pursued criminal prosecutions
as well, prosecuting thirty-one cases, sixty-four persons, during 2002.10 The DICJ has been
pursuing civil damages against the former management of failed financial institutions.'16
97. Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 42.
98. Id. art. 49-2.
99. Id. art. 55.
100. Id. art. 137.
101. Id. arts. 37, 136.
102. Id.
103. This is based on the asset investigation right provided to public institutions to penalize financial insti-
tutions. DICJ can conduct on-site inspections and interview relevant persons in this relation.
104. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2003, supra note 73, at 14-15.
105. Id. at 15-16.
106. Id. at 16-17.
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The wide-ranging enforcement actions present an effective and efficient operation of the
DICJ. The importance of effective use of sanctions has been highlighted in Japan, with the
SESC granted greater financial sanctioning power.5 7
4. Independence and Adequacy of Resources:
Oversight of the DICJ falls within the purview of the Prime Minister and Finance Min-
ister. °s The budget and accounts of DICJ are subject to approval by the Prime Minister
and the Finance Minister.? 9 However, there are no statutory obligations to report to the
Prime Minister and Finance Minister.
The independence of the DICJ is inadequate compared to other deposit insurers, given
that critical decisions either are made or subject to approval by the Prime Minister or FSA
minister. Nevertheless, the criteria for the various measures are clearly identified in the
Deposit Insurance Law, which creates a clearer framework within which the DICJ can
operate without giving due political considerations. In addition, the independence of the
DICJ has not been viewed as controversial in light of the operational nature of its functions.
As mentioned above, there is a cooperative relationship with the Prime Minister and Fi-
nance Minister as well as the FSA.
The power of the DICJ may become greater if differential insurance premiums are ap-
plied according to the risk profile of the financial institution. The DICJ holds decision-
making power over the application of such premiums."10
The DICJ staff has increased from twenty-eight to 409 because of the new changes
brought about by the amendments in the Deposit Insurance Law."' The subsidiary of the
DICJ, the RCC, which is responsible for writing off non-performing loans and reviving
insolvent financial institutions, comprises a staff of 2,300.Japan Succession Bank, the bridge
bank, and the Industrial Revitalization Institute were established with full capitalization
from the DICJ. Together, the adequacy of DICJ resources is comprehensive and wide
ranging.
It is uncertain whether the adequacy of resources will increase or decrease in the near
future. There are some preDICJtions that the need for resources will gradually lessen as
the number of bank failures decrease. On the other hand, some foresee a need for greater
resources when the payoff of deposit insurance becomes feasible.
5. Procedural Adequacy:
The Deposit Insurance Law and the Financial Revitalization Law provide a clear pro-
cedure for the provision of deposit insurance as well as financial assistance to financial
institutions. There is a wide range of literature available from the DICJ website furnishing
information on procedures.
6. Adequacy of Compensation:
Currently, all current accounts are protected, and most accounts are guaranteed up to a
maximum of JPY1 0 million. Compensation is adequate and equivalent to the amount pro-
tected in the United States or European Union.
107. The SESC will be able to sanction both criminal and administrative charges with financial penalties,
which will be raised. Strengthening the SESC, NimtEE (June 25, 2004).
108. Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 45.
109. Id. arts. 39, 40.
110. This power derives from article 51 of the Deposit Insurance Law. See Law No. 34 of 1971, art. 51.
111. See ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 2003, supra note73.
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7. Speed of Claims and Recoveries:
Payment of deposit insurance has never actually occurred in the past, and there is no
guideline on the timeframe for payments. However, the DICJ can make a temporary pay-
ment of JPY600,000 for the convenience of depositors. The procedures inDICJate a rela-
tively lengthy process for obtaining insurance payments." 2
VII. Conclusion
While Japan has adopted a unified financial regulator similar to the U.K. Financial Ser-
vices Authority, the DICJ remains external to the FSA. Its operation has expanded consid-
erably because of the financial crisis in Japan. Though the DICJ operates with guidance
from the FSA, its wide range of operations ensures practical independence, resources, and
external credibility.
The analysis of the Japanese situation makes clear that, while the case for a unified reg-
ulator might be justified for political reasons, the inclusion of a deposit insurer is not nec-
essarily compelling. The DICJ has been extremely active in Japan and has assisted in the
revitalization of various financial institutions over the years, which would most probably
not have been possible if it were under the management of the FSA. The DICJ has recap-
tured the benefits of accumulating expertise on deposit insurance and related financial as-
sistance, which has benefited its status in the financial sector. The FSCS, on the other hand,
appears more similar to the U.K. Financial Services Authority, undertaking a limited role
within the financial sector.
The coexistence of a single regulator and the deposit insurer (or any other financial
regulator for that matter) depends on effective and coherent coordination. There needs to
be a lead regulator, and all regulators need to hold an equal footing in terms of the prestige
they garner from their roles. Without the respect that each party should be accorded, the
division of labour may not be as well played out as stipulated.
The functions of the FSA and the DICJ have become well delineated and coordinated
as a result of recent reforms. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reform of the central govern-
ment that has recently taken place has had an effect in improving various aspects of regu-
latory efficiency. As the reform and unification occur almost simultaneously, it is difficult
to determine what has brought about the improvement upon regulatory workings. Presum-
ably, as a newly established agency with a new corporate culture in need of cultivation, the
FSA has better incorporated the spirit of the reform. In that sense, the unification, which
would increase the range of activities and regulatory authority maintained by the FSA, may
boost the morale of staff members employed by the agency.
The DICJ has benefited from the clarification of its role and the added responsibility of
financial assistance. As the profile of the DICJ has grown with the publicity it has received
through the freeze on deposit insurance payoffs, it has attracted considerable attention.
With the additional functions it now administers, and the coordination, it is required to
maintain with the other financial safety net participants, the morale of staff has improved,
with concurrent increase in the scrutiny of its operations.
The effective functioning of the structure is due to the clear division of labour between
the regulator and the deposit insurance body. The deposit insurer is given a clear mandate
112. Overview, supra note 82, at 11.
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and operational functions containing specified procedures. This makes its independence
better defined and its existence as a separate entity justified.
As the number of bank failures decrease and the payoff of deposit insurance materializes,
there is a likelihood that the situation may change. However, discussion of merging the
deposit insurer with the regulator is non-existent, as there are other regulatory agencies,
such as the BOJ and the SESC, which are independent from the FSA. Existence of both
regulatory competition among supervisors/inspectors and of strong cooperative relationship
between complimentary organs, such as the DICJ and the FSA, has resulted in the greater
specialization of agencies and the enhanced effectiveness of their operations.
VOL. 39, NO. 1
